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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: PROTECTING
“ALL BUT THE PLAINLY INCOMPETENT”
(AND MAYBE SOME OF THEM, TOO)
SUSAN BENDLIN*
Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to
make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Public officials can be more certain than ever before that
qualified immunity will shield them from suits for money damages
even if their actions violate the constitutional rights of another. In
the October 2011 term, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted qualified immunity to government officials in four
significant cases and denied it to none.2 In all four cases, the Court
overturned an appellate court’s denial of qualified immunity,3
thereby signaling a broad and generous application of the
protective doctrine to those “who carr[y] out the work of the
government.”4 Additionally, the Supreme Court denied petitions
for writs of certiorari in thirty-seven other cases involving
qualified immunity,5 letting stand twenty-eight instances where
* The author, an Assistant Professor at Barry University School of Law, has
served as Dean of Students at three law schools: Emory, Duke, and Barry. She
wishes to thank her research assistants, Rihana Quashie (JD Candidate,
2014) and Amy German (JD Candidate, 2013).
1. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244-45 (2012) (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)).
2. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1668 (2012); Messerschmidt, 132 S.
Ct. at 1250-51; Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990-92 (2012) (per curiam);
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012).
3. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1668; Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250-51;
Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 990-92; Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093.
4. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1665 (referring to the shield of qualified
immunity protecting “those who carr[y] out the work of the government”).
5. Sharp v. Johnson, No. 11-1357, 2012 WL 1657210 (U.S. June 25, 2012)
(mem.), denying cert. to 669 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2012); Suffolk Cnty., N.Y. v.
Field Day, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2749 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 463 F.3d 167
(2d Cir. 2006); Morgan v. Swanson, 132 S. Ct. 2740 (2012) (mem.), denying
cert. to 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011); Swanson v. Morgan, 132 S. Ct. 2740
(2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011); Estate of Henson
v. Krajca, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 440 Fed. Appx. 341
(5th Cir. 2011); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (mem.), denying
cert. to 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012); Rockwell v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 2433 (2012)
1023
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the appellate courts granted qualified immunity.6 In only ten cases
did the Court leave undisturbed a denial of qualified immunity.7
(mem.), denying cert. to 664 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2011); Daman v. Brooks, 132 S.
Ct. 2681 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011); Agarano
v. Mattos, 132 S. Ct. 2682 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 661 F.3d 433 (9th
Cir. 2011); Brooks v. Daman, 132 S. Ct. 2682 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to
661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011); Mattos v. Agarano, 132 S. Ct. 2684 (2012)
(mem.), denying cert. to 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011); Lafond v. Ammons, 132
S. Ct. 2379 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 648 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2011);
Cilman v. Reeves, 132 S. Ct. 2385 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 452 Fed.
Appx. 263 (4th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 132 S. Ct.
2380 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 439 Fed. Appx. 433 (6th Cir. 2011);
Gardner v. Chism, 132 S. Ct. 1916 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 661 F.3d 380
(9th Cir. 2011); Moore v. Perkins, 132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012) (mem.), denying cert.
to 450 Fed. Appx. 341 (5th Cir. 2011); Loudermilk v. Danner, 132 S. Ct. 1797
(2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 449 Fed. Appx. 693 (9th Cir. 2011); Moore v.
Guerrero, 132 S. Ct. 1793 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 442 Fed. Appx. 57
(4th Cir. 2011); Cnty. of L.A., Cal. v. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs, 132 S. Ct.
1797 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 648 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011); Johnson v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 132 S. Ct. 1807 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 658
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011); N. Las Vegas Police Dept. v. Conatser, 132 S. Ct.
1740 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 445 Fed. Appx. 932 (9th Cir. 2011); Makas
v. Miraglia, 132 S. Ct. 1769 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 435 Fed. Appx. 51
(2d Cir. 2011); Norris v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012) (mem.),
denying cert. to 2011 WL 1793278 (Cal. Ct. App. May 11, 2011); Signature
Pharm., Inc. v. Wright, 132 S. Ct. 1714 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 438 Fed.
Appx. 741 (11th Cir. 2011); Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 132 S. Ct.
1558 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011); Diana v.
Oliphant, 132 S. Ct. 1557 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 441 Fed. Appx. 76 (3d
Cir. 2011); Sandel v. Williams, 132 S. Ct. 1558 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to
433 Fed. Appx. 353 (6th Cir. 2011); Williams v. Sandel, 132 S. Ct. 1622 (2012)
(mem.), denying cert. to 433 Fed. Appx. 353 (6th Cir. 2011); C.F. v. Corbett,
132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 654 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011);
Troyanos v. Coats, 132 S. Ct. 1560 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 372 Fed.
Appx. 932 (11th Cir. 2010); Susko v. City of Weirton, W. Va., 132 S. Ct. 1145
(2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 443 Fed. Appx. 805 (4th Cir. 2011); Alvis v.
Espinosa, 132 S. Ct. 1089 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 598 F.3d 528 (9th
Cir. 2010); Noriega v. Torres, 132 S. Ct. 1032 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to
648 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2011); Purnell v. Henry, 132 S. Ct. 781 (2011) (mem.),
denying cert. to 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011); Hayden v. Green, 132 S. Ct. 543
(2011) (mem.), denying cert. to 640 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 2011); Castle v.
Thompson, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011) (mem.), denying cert. to 631 F.3d 1194 (11th
Cir. 2011); Lillo v. Bruhn, 132. S. Ct. 244 (2011) (mem.), denying cert. to 413
Fed. Appx. 161 (11th Cir. 2011).
6. Sharp, 2012 WL 1657210; Morgan, 132 S. Ct. 2740; Swanson, 132 S.
Ct. 2740; Estate of Henson, 132 S. Ct. 2742; Lebron, 132 S Ct. 2751; Rockwell,
132 S. Ct. 2433; Daman, 132 S. Ct. 2681; Agarano, 132 S. Ct. 2682; Brooks,
132 S. Ct. 2682; Mattos, 132 S. Ct. 2684; Lafond, 132 S. Ct. 2379; Cilman, 132
S. Ct. 2385; Rodriguez, 132 S. Ct. 2380; Moore, 132 S. Ct. 1861; Loudermilk,
132 S. Ct. 1797; Cnty. of L.A., 132 S. Ct. 1797; Makas, 132 S. Ct. 1769; Norris,
132 S. Ct. 1742; Signature Pharm., 132 S. Ct. 1714; Diana, 132 S. Ct. 1557;
Sandel, 132 S. Ct. 1558; Williams, 132 S. Ct. 1622; Corbett, 132 S. Ct. 1566;
Troyanos, 132 S. Ct. 1560; Susko, 132 S. Ct. 1145; Hayden, 132 S. Ct. 543;
Castle, 132 S. Ct. 251; Lillo, 132. S. Ct. 244.
7. Suffolk Cnty., N.Y., 132 S. Ct. 2749; Lafond, 132 S. Ct. 2379; Gardner,
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There was a split in one case where the court of appeals granted
qualified immunity to one defendant and denied it to the other.8 In
that case, the defendants submitted a petition for certiorari, which
the Supreme Court denied, letting stand the appellate court’s
decision to grant qualified immunity to one defendant and siding
with the denial of qualified immunity to the other defendant.9
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields state officials from
individual liability for violations of constitutional rights if the test
for immunity is met.10 For many years, the test involved two
inquiries: (1) whether the facts show that the actions of the public
official violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the official’s alleged
misconduct.11 In 2009, the Supreme Court held that courts may
address these two questions in either order ending an eight-year
period during which it was mandatory to analyze the two inquiries
in sequential order.12 As a result, many courts (including the
Supreme Court) are now avoiding the first question entirely.13
The Supreme Court’s position is that government officials
should be able to count on the protection afforded by qualified
immunity.14 Chief Justice John Roberts recently wrote that “[a]n
uncertain immunity is little better than no immunity at all.”15
There are two ways of attaining more certainty. One is for the
Supreme Court to issue opinions that address and clarify the law
on confusing constitutional questions.16 If the law were clearer,
state officials would have better guidance about what they can
legally do and they would be less likely to violate rights in the
process. Another is by simply granting qualified immunity in every
case except the most egregious instances of incompetent conduct

132 S. Ct. 1916; Moore, 132 S. Ct. 1793; Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 1807; N. Las
Vegas Police Dept., 132 S. Ct. 1740; Coscia, 32 S. Ct. 1558; Alvis, 132 S. Ct.
1089; Noriega, 132 S. Ct. 1032; Purnell, 132 S. Ct. 781.
8. Lafond, 132 S. Ct. 2379.
9. Id.
10. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known”).
11. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
12. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
13. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
14. See Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1665-66 (demonstrating the importance of
qualified immunity).
15. Id. at 1666.
16. An example would be whether the Tinker test allowing public schools
to regulate students’ on-campus speech should apply to off-campus Internet
speech that disrupts the campus. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (applying interference test to determine
whether in-school speech was constitutionally protected).
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by state officials. The latter approach is the one currently taken by
the Supreme Court.
“Qualified immunity ‘gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,’ and ‘protects
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.’”17 This Article does not contend that any specific state
officials are plainly incompetent, nor is it fair to say that qualified
immunity was wrongly granted in any of the cases decided by the
Supreme Court during this term. On the contrary, government
workers should be shielded from individual liability when they
perform their jobs reasonably and competently. The real concern,
however, is that the test is evolving to the point where almost
every governmental actor will be shielded from individual liability
by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Troublesome aspects of the
Supreme Court’s current approach include (1) the failure to clarify
important constitutional questions, and (2) the blurring of the
distinction between absolute and qualified immunity for all
practical purposes by assuring state officials that they can be
certain of the shield from liability.
This Article focuses narrowly on the Supreme Court’s most
recent qualified immunity decisions in which state officials are
shielded from suit even without any determination as to whether
their actions violated citizens’ constitutional rights. Part II of this
Article discusses how the qualified immunity test has recently
changed. Part III summarizes the newest Supreme Court decisions
on qualified immunity. Part IV addresses some problematic
aspects of the current approach.
II. THE TWO-PRONGED TEST FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND HOW
THE TEST HAS EVOLVED
Most government officials—in their individual capacities—are
immune from liability for money damages for their official
actions.18 Some, based on the importance of their functions, are
entitled to absolute immunity when they act within the scope of
their authority.19 Examples include legislators, judges,
“prosecutors in their role as advocates,” and “witnesses giving
testimony at trial.”20 Other state officials whose functions are less
vital are not protected by absolute immunity, but will be granted
17. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244-45 (quoting Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at
2085).
18. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also D.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding a teacher was
protected by qualified immunity).
19. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012) (stating that the
Court takes what has been termed a “functional approach” and citing
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)).
20. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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qualified immunity to shield them from individual liability in
certain situations.21 These include “the chief executive officer of a
State,” “the senior and subordinate officers of a State’s National
Guard,” “the president of a state university,” police officers, and
public school officials.22
A. The Two-Pronged Test for Qualified Immunity
The test for qualified immunity as announced in Saucier v.
Katz23 was (1) whether the state official’s actions violated a
constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct.24 In
Saucier, the Supreme Court held that the first inquiry had to be
addressed first.25 However, in 2009, the Court in Pearson v.
Callahan26 abolished mandatory sequencing and held that courts
may address the two prongs of the test in either order.27
While acknowledging that a positive aspect of the Saucier
protocol was that “the two-step procedure promotes the
development of constitutional precedent,”28 the Supreme Court
also stated that, on the negative side, it “sometimes results in a
substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult
questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case.”29 The
Pearson Court concluded that federal courts “should be permitted
to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”30
To support its abandonment of the sequencing requirement,
the Supreme Court in Pearson described several situations where
skipping the first step of the qualified immunity analysis might be
desirable.31 These situations include: (1) “cases in which it is plain
that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from
obvious whether in fact there is such a right;”32 (2) cases where
parties must endure “the costs of litigating constitutional

21. See id. (listing examples of officials who will only be protected by
qualified immunity in certain situations).
22. Id. (internal citations omitted).
23. Saucier, 533 U.S. 194.
24. Id. at 200.
25. Id. at 201. The “threshold” is, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the
party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right?” Id. If not, the inquiry ends. Id. If so, then “the
next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id.
26. Pearson, 555 U.S. 223.
27. Id. at 236.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 236-37.
30. Id. at 236.
31. Id. at 237-39.
32. Id. at 237.
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questions and delays attributable to resolving them—when the
suit otherwise could be disposed of more readily;”33 (3) “cases in
which the constitutional question is so factbound that the decision
provides little guidance for future cases;”34 (4) cases where “it
appears that the question will soon be decided by a higher court;”35
(5) “cases in which resolution of the constitutional question
requires clarification of an ambiguous state statute . . . or
“‘depends on a federal court’s uncertain assumptions about state
law;’”36 (6) cases where “qualified immunity is asserted at the
pleading stage” and “the precise factual basis for the plaintiff’s
claim or claims may be hard to identify;”37 and (7) cases where “the
first step of the Saucier procedure may create a risk of bad
decisionmaking,” such as when “the briefing of constitutional
questions is woefully inadequate.”38
An important concern was that “[a]dherence to Saucier’s twostep protocol departs from the general rule of constitutional
avoidance and runs counter to the ‘older, wiser judicial counsel not
to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such
adjudication is unavoidable.’”39 One commentator criticized the
“unnecessary [c]onstitutional rulings” resulting from Saucier’s
sequencing requirement, but acknowledged that “[t]he most
prominent justification for the Court’s approach is that it ensures
the continued evolution of constitutional rights.”40 He added,
“[a]lthough this is a powerful justification for unnecessary
constitutional rulings, it overlooks an important consideration.
When a court reaches out to decide the constitutional issue, it will
not necessarily rule that the right exists.”41
Even if the Supreme Court were to determine that no
constitutional right existed in a given situation, that decision
clarifies the law. Such clarity is beneficial, as was observed
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 238.
36. Id. (quoting Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 110 (3d Cir. 2008)).
37. Id. at 238-39.
38. Id. at 239.
39. Id. at 241 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 388 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
40. Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83
N.C. L. REV. 847, 857 (2005) (stating that “[b]y reaching constitutional issues
even in cases where a non-constitutional issue is dispositive, courts are able to
articulate new constitutional rights that will benefit later litigants. This is
especially important in areas such as qualified immunity and habeas corpus,
where relief can be granted only if the right has been clearly established”). Id.
The author’s view, however, was that unnecessary constitutional decisions are
unwarranted and do not demonstrably advance individual rights because the
Supreme Court often rules against plaintiffs and finds that there was no
constitutional right at issue. Id.
41. Id.
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eloquently in earlier Supreme Court opinions. For example, a
decade earlier in Siegert v. Gilley,42 the Supreme Court made the
seemingly inherently logical statement that “[a] necessary
concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional
right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the
defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has
asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”43 This same
point was reemphasized in 2001 when the Court stated that “[t]he
law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to
skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established
that the officer’s conduct was unlawful.”44
After Pearson, many courts reserved the ability to jump
straight into an analysis of the second inquiry,45 that is, whether
the constitutional right in question was clearly established at the
time of the official’s action. Although Pearson did not rule that
courts could entirely disregard the first prong, that is what has
occurred even at the Supreme Court level.46
Because the qualified immunity test has been applied
differently post-Pearson, the old two-pronged definition seems no
longer relevant even though it has not been officially abandoned.
The current test focuses on the second prong. There appear to be
two aspects of the analysis as to whether the right was clearly
established: (1) at the time of the action, was the law clearly
established based on precedent from the Supreme Court or other
binding authority? And (2) under the circumstances, would a
reasonable, competent official have known that his actions were
illegal?47
B. A Previous Empirical Study of Qualified Immunity Decisions
The above-mentioned emphasis on the second prong—
whether the right was clearly established—is not surprising when
one examines the history of qualified immunity analysis. In an
extensive empirical study of qualified immunity, Greg Sobolski
and Matt Steinberg analyzed 741 appellate qualified immunity
42. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
43. Id. at 232.
44. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
45. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (stating that
“courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualifiedimmunity analysis to tackle first”); Millender v. Cnty. of L.A., 620 F.3d 1016,
1024 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds by Messerschmidt, 132 S.
Ct. 1235.
46. See, e.g., Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093.
47. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245; see also Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239
(emphasizing that “qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known’” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
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cases from 1976 to 2008.48 Only a few other empirical studies have
been done, and those involved much smaller samples.49 One
unsurprising consensus in the studies is that when courts address
the two prongs in sequential order, there are fewer cases where
the constitutional question is skipped.50
The Sobolski-Steinberg study divided the qualified immunity
jurisprudence into four time periods.51 Those time periods are
marked by a shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to the twopronged test and whether it was mandatory to address the first
prong (whether a constitutional violation occurred) before turning
to the second prong (whether the constitutional right was clearly
established at the time the action was taken).52 Sobolski and
Steinberg referred to this approach as “sequencing.”53
The four time frames are: (1) from Pierson v. Ray54 in 1967 to
Siegert in 1991 (described as a period where courts were free to
address the questions in either order without guidance from the
Supreme Court);55 (2) from Siegert to Saucier in 2001 (described as
a period of confusion among courts and scholars as to whether it
was mandatory to address the constitutional right before

48. Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of
Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v.
Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 525 (2010).
49. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 40, at 857 (analyzing two years of case law);
Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 670 (2009) (analyzing six years of case law);
Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the
Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 404 (2009)
(analyzing case law from three general time periods).
50. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 526 (citing Hughes, supra note
49 and Leong, supra note 49). The empirical study also revealed that even
though courts that followed the Saucier sequencing found more claims of
constitutional violations, the percentage of plaintiffs who ultimately recovered
damages decreased after Saucier. Id. at 527. Courts more frequently answered
“yes” to the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred but more
often said “no” as to whether that right was clearly established at the time of
the action. Id. at 549 (stating that “[p]re-Saucier, 83% (114 of 136) of rightsaffirming holding were followed by denials of qualified immunity . . . [but]
[p]ost-Saucier, 72% of (123 of 170) of rights-affirming holdings were attached
to denials of qualified immunity”). There was, however, an increase from 17%
to 28% in grants of qualified immunity in the same time periods, showing a
statistically significant increase in granting protection from suit to
government officials. Id.
51. Id. at 528; see also Hughes, supra note 49, at 404 (dividing the cases
into only three time periods: “(1) the period prior to the Supreme Court’s
development of the sequencing doctrine, (2) the period when sequencing was
advisable but not considered mandatory, and (3) the [then-]present, postWilson-Saucier period where sequencing is mandatory”).
52. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 528.
53. Id.
54. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
55. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 530.
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analyzing whether it was clearly established at the time);56 (3)
from Saucier to Pearson in 2009 (described as a period of explicitly
mandated sequencing);57 and (4) Post-Pearson (described as a
period where sequencing is discretionary but encouraged).58 This
Article does not re-address the shift that occurred in each time
period. The purpose of mentioning the four periods is to
acknowledge the significant swings in the Supreme Court’s past
qualified immunity analysis.
Referring to the first prong of the test as “the constitutional
question,” Sobolski and Steinberg observed that more courts
declined to analyze the first prong during time periods when the
Supreme Court had not clearly mandated that the two questions
be addressed in sequence.59 Although one study indicated that preSaucier, courts were free to exercise discretion,60 the SobolskiSteinberg empirical study determined that some appellate courts
already regarded sequencing as mandatory even before the
Saucier Court’s pronouncement.61 Pearson ended all speculation by
unequivocally allowing courts to exercise discretion in
sequencing.62
One of the study’s observations about past cases is equally
true now in light of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions:
that there is less clarification of constitutional rights when courts
are free to skip the first prong in the qualified immunity test.63
The study’s authors indicated that the post-Pearson era would be
an ideal time to study the result of the abandonment of strict
sequencing,64 and this Article takes a look at the newest cases.
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ALL GRANTED QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court issued decisions in four qualified
immunity cases in the October 2011 term. Those cases are
summarized here.
A. Ryburn v. Huff (Decided Jan. 23, 2012)
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s denial of
qualified immunity to two police officers in Ryburn v. Huff,65
56. Id. at 530-31.
57. Id. at 531-32.
58. Id. at 528-29.
59. Id. at 525.
60. Hughes, supra note 49, at 412-13; see also Sobolski & Steinberg, supra
note 48, at 530 (stating that “prior to Saucier sequencing was not mandatory”).
61. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 556.
62. Pearson, 555 U.S. 223; Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 556.
63. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 556.
64. Id. at 527.
65. Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. 987.
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declaring that the officers’ actions were reasonable.66 The case
involved Sergeant Ryburn, Officer Zepeda and two other Burbank
police officers who went to the home of Vincent Huff, a high school
student who had reportedly threatened to “shoot up” the school
after being bullied.67 Based on their training on school violence,
the officers intended to interview young Huff, so they knocked
several times on the front door of his family’s house.68 When no
one answered, Ryburn called the home telephone, but the call
went unanswered.69 He next called Mrs. Huff’s cell phone, and
when she answered, he asked where Vincent was, to which she
replied that he was in the house with her.70 When told that he and
other officers wanted to speak with her outside, Mrs. Huff hung
up.71 Shortly thereafter, the mother and son appeared on the front
steps but, without asking why they were there, Mrs. Huff refused
to allow the officers to go inside and interview Vincent.72 When
Ryburn asked if there were any guns in the house, Mrs. Huff
immediately turned and ran back into the house.73 Suspicious
about her behavior and claiming that he was scared because he
had seen too many officers killed, Ryburn followed her into the
house.74 Zepeda immediately followed because of “officer safety”
concerns.75 The officers stood in the living room and when Mr.
Huff appeared they interviewed him and his son for five or ten
minutes, but conducted no search.76 Concluding that the rumors of
threatened violence were unfounded, the officers reported their
determination to the school.77
The Huffs sued the police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.78 After a two-day
bench trial, the district court concluded that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity and entered judgment in their
favor.79 The Ninth Circuit reversed as to Ryburn and Zepeda (the
two who knew there was no consent to enter), concluding that
although police officers are allowed to enter a home if they
reasonably believe that it is necessary to protect themselves or

66. Id. at 992.
67. Id. at 988.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 988-89.
73. Id. at 989.
74. Id.
75. Id. (noting also that two other officers entered, but they had not heard
the verbal exchange and assumed that consent to enter was granted).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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others from harm, these two acted unreasonably and should not be
shielded by qualified immunity.80 Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson of
the Ninth Circuit wrote that the majority had relied on a sanitized
version of the facts, and that an officer in that situation “could
have reasonably believed that he was justified in making a
warrantless entry.”81
The Supreme Court held:
[R]easonable officers in petitioners’ position could have come to the
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the
Huff residence if there was an objectively reasonable basis for
fearing that violence was imminent. And a reasonable officer could
have come to such a conclusion based on the facts as found by the
District Court.82

Rather than looking at the situation from the viewpoint of the
Huffs (the aggrieved parties), the Court reviewed the scenario in
light of the officers’ perceptions.83 Emphasizing that “judges
should be cautious about second-guessing a police officer’s
assessment, made on the scene,” the Court sided with the officers
and granted them qualified immunity.84
B. Messerschmidt v. Millender (Decided Feb. 22, 2012)
The Supreme Court of the United States held in
Messerschmidt v. Millender85 that Detective Messerschmidt and
his fellow officer Lawrence were entitled to qualified immunity
when they were sued after searching a house pursuant to a
warrant. Messerschmidt prepared the search warrant and showed
to his two supervising officers and the Deputy District Attorney
before submitting it to a magistrate who approved it.86 The
Supreme Court indicated that the validity of the warrant itself
was not at issue, and that the sole question was whether the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity “even assuming that
the warrant should not have been issued.”87
The case involved a search of a home occupied by the
Millender family.88 A weapon confiscated during the search
belonged to the grandmother who later sued for violation of her

80. Id. at 989-90 (stating that ‘“any belief that the officers or other family
members were in serious, imminent harm would have been objectively
unreasonable’ given that [Mrs. Huff] merely asserted her right to end her
conversation with the officers and returned to her home”).
81. Id. at 990.
82. Id. at 992.
83. Id. at 991-92.
84. Id.
85. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. 1235.
86. Id. at 1243.
87. Id. at 1244.
88. Id. at 1240.
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Fourth Amendment rights.89 The officers were searching for
evidence of a crime in which the suspect, Jerry Ray Bowen, shot at
his girlfriend as she attempted to break up with him.90 The victim
told police that her boyfriend fired at her with a sawed-off shotgun
and told her that he would kill her if she tried to leave.91 She also
told police that Bowen was affiliated with a local street gang, the
Mona Park Crips.92 The crime, however, did not appear to be
related to gang activity.93 Bowen fired the gun at Kelly as she was
attempting to drive away after moving out of an apartment to
which Bowen had the key.94
Drafted by Detective Messerschmidt, the search warrant
authorized two broad searches, one for “[a]ll handguns, rifles, or
shotguns of any caliber, or any firearms capable of firing
ammunition,” and the other for “[a]rticles of evidence showing
street gang membership.”95 The Ninth Circuit held that this
search warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad in two ways.96
First, the warrant failed to establish probable cause to search for
“all firearms” instead of only the black sawed-off shotgun
reportedly used in the crime.97 Second, the warrant was defective
because it failed to establish any link between the domestic
violence incident and the request to search for gang-related
materials.98 The Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity on the
grounds that “a reasonable officer in the deputies’ position would
have been well aware of this [constitutional] deficiency,” and
therefore, the test for immunity could not be met.99
In holding that Messerschmidt and Lawrence should be
shielded from suit,100 the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc denial101 of qualified immunity.102 The Supreme
Court focused on the second prong of the test for qualified
immunity, skipping the first aspect entirely.103 The Court stated
that “[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1258 n.10.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1244.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1241.
Millender, 620 F.3d at 1034-35.
Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250-51.
Id. at 1244.
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rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”104 The
Court did, however, acknowledge that the shield of immunity
could be lost if a warrant was “‘based on an affidavit so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable.’”105 The Court determined that the warrant
in question was not so plainly defective and the officers’ belief in
its validity was reasonable.106
With regard to the search for “all firearms,” the Supreme
Court came up with possible scenarios in which a search for
weapons other than the sawed-off shotgun that Bowen used might
have been permissible.107 The majority concluded that “it would
not have been entirely unreasonable” for Messerschmidt and
Lawrence to have believed they had probable cause to search for
all the evidence they sought.108 For example, the officers could
have believed that Bowen owned additional firearms, and it was
reasonable for them to assume that some of those guns might be
illegal and that “seizure of the firearms was necessary to prevent
further assaults on Kelly.”109
As to the search for gang-related evidence, the Court found a
way to characterize the attack as one that was possibly linked to
Bowen’s gang membership.110 Indicating that the attack was not
simply a domestic dispute, but that it was described in the
affidavit as “spousal assault and an assault with a deadly
weapon,”111 the majority concluded that “[a] reasonable officer
could certainly view Bowen’s attack as motivated not by the
souring of his romantic relationship with Kelly but instead by a
desire to prevent her from disclosing details of his gang activity to
the police.”112 Viewing the scenario in that light, a search for gangrelated material was deemed relevant.113 The Supreme Court then
sidestepped whether these interpretations of the facts would have
amounted to probable cause, and merely concluded that “[t]he
officers’ judgment that the scope of the warrant was supported by
probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was not ‘plainly
incompetent.’”114
The Supreme Court further stated that “[w]here the alleged
104. Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, which quoted Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818, the case in which the good faith requirement was purged from the
qualified immunity test).
105. Id. at 1245 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)).
106. Id. at 1246.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1246-47.
109. Id. at 1246.
110. Id. at 1247.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1249 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
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Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure
pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has
issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted
in an objectively reasonable manner.”115 Moreover, the majority
wrote that the appropriate inquiry is not whether the magistrate
erred, but “whether the magistrate so obviously erred that any
reasonable officer would have recognized the error.”116 Only on
rare occasions would such an obvious error be made, stated Chief
Justice John Roberts, and he indicated that, likewise, only in rare
circumstances should “personal liability [be imposed] on a lay
officer in the face of judicial approval of his actions.”117
The dissent took issue with the majority view, writing that
“[t]he Court’s analysis bears little relationship to the record in this
case, our precedents, or the purposes underlying qualified
immunity analysis.”118 Justice Sotomayor continued in her dissent
that the correct inquiry is “not whether different conclusions
might conceivably be drawn from the crime scene,” but instead, it
is “whether a ‘reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner’s
position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish
probable cause.’”119 Concluding that a reasonable officer could not
have believed that he had probable cause to search for gangrelated evidence, Justice Sotomayor characterized the search by
Messerschmidt as the “kind of fishing expedition for evidence of
unidentified criminal activity committed by unspecified persons
[that] was the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to
prevent.”120
The dissent also criticized the majority’s erosion of Malley v.
Briggs’s holding that an officer “cannot excuse his own default by
pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate.”121 Justice
Sotomayor described the effect of the majority’s decision as one
“hold[ing] blameless the ‘plainly incompetent’ action of the police
officer seeking a warrant because of the ‘plainly incompetent’
approval of his superiors and the district attorney.”122
One of her stated concerns was that the majority’s holding
will encourage “sloppy police work” and “exacerbate[e] the risk” of
Fourth Amendment violations.123 Just as eloquently as Chief
Justice Roberts described the purposes underlying the qualified

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
n.9).
122.
123.

Id. at 1245 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23).
Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id. at 1253 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1256 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1260 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 346
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Do Not Delete

2012]

11/17/2012 9:14 PM

Qualified Immunity

1037

immunity doctrine in Filarsky v. Delia124 by pointing to history
and tradition,125 Justice Sotomayor heralded the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment stating that “efforts ‘to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.’”126
C. Filarsky v. Delia (Decided Apr. 17, 2012)
The issue in Filarsky127 was whether qualified immunity
would extend to a private attorney who was hired by the city to
conduct an internal affairs investigation of possible wrongdoing by
a city firefighter.128 The question as framed by the Supreme Court
was “whether an individual hired by the government to do its work
is prohibited from seeking such immunity, solely because he works
for the government on something other than a permanent or fulltime basis.”129
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Filarsky was not entitled to
qualified immunity “because he was a private attorney and not a
City employee,”130 but the Supreme Court held otherwise. Stating
that the common law “did not draw a distinction between public
servants and private individuals engaged in public service in
according protection to those carrying out government
responsibilities,”131 the Court traced the history and the purposes
of qualified immunity and concluded that Filarsky was entitled to
protection.132
The Court emphasized that its holding was consistent with
the important reasons that justify the doctrine of qualified
immunity. The reasons are: (1) the shield of qualified immunity
helps to “avoid ‘unwarranted timidity’ in performance of public
duties” and ensures that “those who serve the government do so
‘with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good,’”133 (2) qualified immunity ensures that “talented candidates
are not deterred from public service,”134 and (3) the grant of
124. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. 1657.
125. Id. at 1667-68.
126. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1261 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)).
127. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. 1657.
128. Id. at 1660.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1661.
131. Id. at 1663.
132. Id. at 1667-68.
133. Id. at 1665 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992)).
134. Id. at 1665. The Court added:
To the extent such private individuals do not depend on the government
for their livelihood, they have freedom to select other work—work that

Do Not Delete

1038

11/17/2012 9:14 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[45:1023

qualified immunity “prevent[s] the harmful distractions from
carrying out the work of government that can often accompany
damages suits.”135
The majority did not address whether the test for qualified
immunity would be met in this factual scenario, and Justice
Ginsburg in her concurrence suggested that there should still be
an inquiry into whether Filarsky “knew or should have known
that his conduct violated a right ‘clearly established’ at the
time.”136 The important point in this case is that the Supreme
Court extended the reach of the protective shield so that even a
private employee can be covered in certain instances.
D. Reichle v. Howards (Decided June 4, 2012)
In Reichle v. Howards,137 the Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity to Secret Service
agents Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle, who were part of a protective
detail guarding then-Vice President Dick Cheney during a public
appearance at a shopping mall in Colorado.138 The agents were
sued for allegedly violating the Fourth and First Amendment
rights of a man who aroused suspicion, touched Vice President
Cheney on the shoulder, and then lied about it.139 That man,
Steven Howards, was overheard by Agent Doyle saying, “I’m going
to ask [the Vice President] how many kids he’s killed today.”140
Howards then got in line to greet the Vice President.141 In a brief
encounter, Howards told Cheney that his “policies in Iraq are
disgusting,” and when the Vice President simply thanked Howards
and moved on, Howards touched Cheney on the shoulder and
walked away.142 Secret Service Agent Reichle approached
Howards, who refused to speak with him.143 Howards tried to

will not expose them to liability for government actions. This makes it
more likely that the most talented candidates will decline public
engagements if they do not receive the same immunity enjoyed by their
public employee counterparts.
Id. at 1666.
135. Id. at 1665. The court added “[n]ot only will such individuals’
performance of any ongoing government responsibilities suffer from the
distraction of lawsuits, but such distractions will also often affect any public
employees with whom they work by embroiling those employees in litigation.”
Id. at 1666.
136. Id. at 1668 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
137. Reichle, 132 S. Ct. 2088.
138. Id. at 2091.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
142. Id. at 2091-92.
143. Id. at 2091.
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leave, but Agent Reichle stepped in front of him.144 When Reichle
asked Howards if he touched Vice President Cheney, he said
“no.”145 After confirming that several agents saw the touch—some
describing it as a shove146—Agent Reichle arrested Howards.147
Howard was transferred to local law enforcement officials who
charged him with violating the state law on harassment.148
Howards sued the agents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that he was arrested and searched without probable cause in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that his arrest was in
retaliation for his criticism of the Vice President and thus violated
his First Amendment rights.149 The district court denied summary
judgment to the agents who claimed they were entitled to qualified
immunity, and on interlocutory appeal, a divided Tenth Circuit
panel decided that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity
as to the Fourth Amendment claim, but not as to the First
Amendment claim.150
The Supreme Court considered whether the officers were also
entitled to qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claim.
The Court stated that the right in question was the “right to be
free from a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by
probable cause.”151 In other words, if the arrest is supported by
probable cause, does a retaliatory motive render the arrest
unconstitutional? The majority emphasized that the Court has
never held that there is a right to be free from a retaliatory arrest
when probable cause justifies the arrest.152 The Court declined to
address it in this case,153 stating that “[t]his approach comports
with our usual reluctance to decide constitutional questions
unnecessarily”.154
Skipping the first prong of the test for qualified immunity,155

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2091 n.1.
147. Id. at 2092.
148. Id. (noting that the charge was eventually dismissed).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2093.
152. Id. at 2094.
153. Id. at 2093 (stating “[w]e elect to address only the second question”,
thus not addressing “whether a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim may
lie despite the presence of probable cause to support the arrest”); see also id. at
2093 n.4 (stating that “[w]e need not (and do not) decide here whether Bivens
extends to First Amendment retaliatory claims.”).
154. Id. at 2093.
155. Id. at 2094. The Supreme Court in Pearson held that courts are
permitted to address the two prongs of the Saucier test in either order.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. It appears from the 2012 decisions that the Supreme
Court is largely dispensing with the old first prong entirely (whether the
conduct violated a constitutional right) and is using a simplified version of
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the Supreme Court addressed whether the purported right was
“clearly established.”156 Concluding that the law was far from
clear,157 the Supreme Court held that Agents Reichle and Doyle
were entitled to qualified immunity.158
Concurring, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the importance of
deferring to the on-the-scene judgment of officers. She wrote,
“[o]fficers assigned to protect public officials must make singularly
swift, on the spot, decisions whether the safety of the person they
are guarding is in jeopardy . . . [i]f rational, that assessment
should not expose them to claims for civil damages.”159
IV. TROUBLESOME ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
A few aspects of the Supreme Court’s recent qualified
immunity decisions are troublesome. These problematic aspects
include (1) the failure to clarify important constitutional rights
that may be infringed upon, and (2) the grant of qualified
immunity in such extreme situations that the distinction between
absolute and qualified immunity is almost eliminated for all
practical purposes. Moreover, the circularity of qualified immunity
reasoning leaves state officials uncertain about their actions and
stagnates the development of the law. These concerns are not
necessarily new, but this section of the Article takes a look at
these issues in light of the four recent Supreme Court opinions.
A. Failure to Articulate Constitutional Rights
The current post-Pearson period where courts are free to
address the two prongs in either order is an excellent time to
analyze how often courts choose to avoid the underlying
constitutional questions.160 The prediction is that there will be less

test, taken from Pearson. Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (stating that “courts may
grant qualified immunity on the ground that a purported right was not ‘clearly
established’ by prior case law, without resolving the often more difficult
question whether the purported right exists at all”).
156. See id. at 2094 (referencing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006),
and the Tenth Circuit opinions in DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618 (10th Cir.
1990) and Poole v. Cnty. of Otero, 271 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2001)).
157. Id. at 2095.
158. Id. at 2097 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that “at the time of
Howard’s arrest, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by
probable cause could violate the First Amendment”).
159. Id.
160. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 527. An observation in the
Sobolski-Steinberg empirical study has been borne out by recent opinions.
They state: “The stakes are high because the difference between mandatory or
discretionary sequencing may bear on the frequency with which courts
address substantive constitutional rights questions, which in turn impacts the
‘rate’ at which constitutional rights are ‘clearly established’ through
precedents.” Id. at 525.
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articulation and less clarification of constitutional rights during
this non-mandatory sequencing period. Anecdotally, that appears
to be true.
The 2012 decisions reveal that the Supreme Court is largely
dispensing with the old first prong entirely (that is, whether the
conduct violated a constitutional right). Although the Supreme
Court held in Pearson that the prongs could be addressed in either
order,161 the reality is that the first prong is not currently being
addressed at all in most cases. For example, the Supreme Court in
Messerschmidt did not reference the traditional two-pronged test,
instead focused on the “clearly established” prong of qualified
immunity analysis.162 Similarly, the Supreme Court skipped the
threshold question in Reichle, which was whether an arrest
justified by probable cause may nonetheless violate the First
Amendment if the arrest was made in retaliation for political
speech.163 The Court acknowledged that certiorari was granted on
two issues, but deliberately avoided the threshold constitutional
one, stating, “[w]e elect to address only the second question”
(whether the law was clearly established).164
Again in Ryburn, the Supreme Court did not apply the twopronged test for qualified immunity.165 Instead of focusing on
whether the Huffs asserted a clearly established Fourth
Amendment right that was violated, the Court viewed the
situation from the vantage point of the police and simply quoted
an earlier opinion saying “it would be silly to suggest that the
police would commit a tort by entering [a residence] . . . to
determine whether violence . . . is about to (or soon will) occur.”166
The Court analyzed whether it was objectively reasonable for the
police to have acted as they did, and the result seemed to be
predisposed in their favor.167 The Court moved swiftly to the
determination that the officers deserved the protection of the
qualified immunity doctrine.168
The Court’s current position is consistent with the
jurisprudential admonition that if a case can be decided on other
than constitutional grounds, the Court should not delve into the
constitutional issue.169 The Supreme Court stated in Pearson that
“[a]dherence to Saucier’s two-step protocol departs from the
161. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
162. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244.
163. Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093.
164. Id.
165. See Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 990 (failing to address both prongs of the
qualified immunity test).
166. Id. (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006)).
167. Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 991-92.
168. Id.
169. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).

Do Not Delete

1042

11/17/2012 9:14 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[45:1023

general rule of constitutional avoidance.”170 In 2012, the Court
expressly reiterated this view, saying “courts may grant qualified
immunity on the ground that a purported right was not ‘clearly
established’ by prior case law, without resolving the often more
difficult question whether the purported right exists at all.”171
The very act of skipping the first step, which is the inquiry
into whether someone’s constitutional right was violated in the
first place, signals a shift in emphasis away from the focus on
individual rights and toward the protection of government officials
who violate those rights. This approach focuses on the official’s
action rather than the aggrieved person’s rights.
The shift in emphasis is apparent in Messerschmidt where the
Supreme Court itself implied that the search warrant probably
should not have been issued because it was unconstitutionally
overbroad, but where the Court constructed scenarios to justify the
officers’ reliance on that warrant.172 This shift in emphasis may
indicate which values are paramount in the eyes of the Court. It is
not the protection of aggrieved citizens that leads the Court to its
current decisions; it is deference to state officials that weighs more
heavily.
B. Determining Whether a Right Was “Clearly Established”
The Supreme Court in Saucier described the second prong
this way: if “the conduct did not violate a clearly established right,
or if it was objectively reasonable for the official to believe that his
conduct did not violate such a right, then the official is protected
by qualified immunity.”173 In defining what “clearly established”
means, the Court said that the inquiry “must be undertaken in
light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition.”174
1. Reference to Well-Settled Law
If binding authority sets forth a rule in a factually analogous
case, one might argue that the law is clearly established. However,
the existence of a rule that may seem clear to a legal scholar does
not mean that the “clearly established” prong of the qualified
immunity test is met.175 The legal guidelines must be viewed in
170. Id. (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
171. Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added).
172. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1246-47.
173. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
174. Id. at 201.
175. See Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (stating that “[t]o be clearly established,
a right must be sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would [have
understood] that what he is doing violates that right [and] . . . ‘existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate’”).
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the context of the actual situation faced by the state official at the
time. Mere reference to well-settled case law is not sufficient to
show that a right is clearly established.176 Nonetheless, case law is
critically important in the analysis; it simply is not dispositive. “It
is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant
legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer
confronts.”177 “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining
whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.”178 In other words, “[t]he contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”179
Even if the state official is mistaken, he or she is still
“entitled to the immunity defense” so long as “the officer’s mistake
as to what the law requires is reasonable.”180 The correct inquiry is
“what the officer reasonably understood his powers and
responsibilities to be, when he acted, under clearly established
standards.”181
In 2001, Justice Ginsburg noted in her Saucier concurrence:
As aptly observed by the Second Circuit, ‘even learned and
experienced jurists have had difficulty in defining the rules that
govern a determination of probable cause . . . . As he tries to find his
way in this thicket, the police officer must not be held to act at his
peril.182

She added, “[l]aw in the area [of probable cause] is constantly
evolving and, correspondingly, variously interpreted.”183 Thus,
reference to case law—without a specific factual context—is
insufficient to resolve whether a right was clearly established at
the time of the official’s actions.

176. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02.
177. Id. at 205.
178. Id. at 202. The court stated, however, that if
various courts have agreed that certain conduct is a constitutional
violation under facts not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts
presented in the case at hand, the officer would not be entitled to
qualified immunity based simply on the argument that courts had not
agreed on one verbal formulation of the controlling standard.
Id. at 202-03.
179. Id. at 202 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
180. Id. at 205.
181. Id. at 208; see also Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (reversing the Court of
Appeals grant of qualified immunity).
182. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 214-15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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2. Were the Officer’s Actions Objectively Reasonable?
The second aspect of “clearly established” focuses on whether
the state official’s actions were objectively reasonable.184 Where
reasonable officials could differ, even if they are mistaken, it
cannot be said that the legal right was “clearly established.”185 The
test is objective.
Prior to 1982,186 the shield of qualified immunity from suit
was only available to those government officials who acted in good
faith.187 The “good faith” requirement was purged from the test for
qualified immunity roughly thirty years ago188 when the Supreme
Court announced that an objective test, rather than a subjective
standard, would be used in determining whether officials in a
given situation were entitled to qualified immunity.189 The test
changed significantly from a subjective inquiry into the mindset of
the government official to the current objective test, that is,
whether the official’s actions were objectively reasonable.190 In
Harlow, the Supreme Court abandoned the good faith
requirement.191
Since Harlow, the objective test has become more and more
184. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
185. See id. at 231 (stating that “[t]he protection of qualified immunity
applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of
law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact”).
186. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
187. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 484 (1978) (stating “officials of the
Executive Branch exercising discretionary functions did not need the
protection of an absolute immunity from suit, but only a qualified immunity
based on good faith and reasonable grounds”) (emphasis added); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (1976) (stating that officials who fall within the
protection of the qualified immunity doctrine “may be held liable for
unconstitutional conduct absent ‘good faith’”) (emphasis added).
188. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
189. Id.
190. Id. As the Second Circuit stated in Doninger, in a decision that the
Supreme Court let stand, it is irrelevant whether the school official’s actions
toward the student were “improperly motivated” because the qualified
immunity test is objective, not subjective, and the mindset of the individual
officer is irrelevant unless “intent is an element” of the claim or defense.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 349 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
449 (2011) (emphasis added).
191. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-17; see also Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald:
The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under
Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 904 (1984) (stating that “Harlow . . .
[held] that the good faith of an official seeking qualified immunity was to be
measured against an ‘objective’ standard”). Although the concurring opinion
adopted by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in Harlow stated that “[t]his
standard would not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating
the law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not ‘reasonably have
been expected’ to know what he actually did know,” the majority attempted to
eliminate or minimize the inquiry into the mindset of the actor. Harlow, 457
U.S. at 816-17; Comment, supra, at 929 n.151.
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“objective,” now covering not only those state officials whose
actions were “reasonable,” but those whose actions were not
“entirely unreasonable.”192 For example, the Court stated in
Messerschmidt that “it would not have been ‘entirely unreasonable’
for an officer to believe that the facts set out in the affidavit
established a fair probability that such evidence would aid the
prosecution of Bowen for the criminal acts at issue.”193 Further,
the majority wrote that “it would not have been ‘entirely
unreasonable’ for an officer to believe . . . that there was probable
cause.”194 The wording itself shows a tendency to view the state
officials’ conduct leniently, shifting the measuring point from what
is “reasonable” to what is “not entirely unreasonable.”195
Currently, the objective government official merely has to act
in a way that is not “entirely unreasonable.”196 He or she must
simply avoid blatantly and incontrovertibly violating the law. The
Supreme Court appears willing to speculate as to possible
acceptable, i.e., reasonable, scenarios so as to justify the actions of
a police officer, as was pointed out by the dissent in
Messerschmidt.197 The Court has interpreted the “all but the
plainly incompetent” rule very broadly and generously, e.g., in
Messerschmidt where the police officers should have known from
experience that the search warrant was overbroad even though it
was issued by a neutral magistrate.198 The Ninth Circuit denied
qualified immunity to the police officers, saying that a reasonable
police officer would have known the warrant was invalid.199 The
Supreme Court, as stated, granted them qualified immunity on
the rationale that even if they were mistaken, their mistake was
reasonable.200 The majority emphasized that the search warrant
“was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that the officers
can be considered ‘plainly incompetent’ for concluding
otherwise.”201
The
majority’s
characterization
of
the
Messerschmidt facts seems speculative, even in the eyes of some
members of the Court.202 The Court’s opinion is, however, an
192. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1239 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 1249.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1254 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that “the Court reaches
this result only by way of an unprecedented, post hoc reconstruction of the
crime that wholly ignores the police’s own conclusions, as well as the
undisputed facts presented to the District Court”).
198. Id. at 1260 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
199. Millender, 620 F.3d at 1035.
200. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250-51.
201. Id. at 1250.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 118-126. Slightly less forcefully,
Justice Kagan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, described the
majority’s analysis as an “inadequate justification.” Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct.
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informative peek into the current mindset of the majority
regarding qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity does not shield “the plainly incompetent,”
nor does qualified immunity protect “those who knowingly violate
the law.”203 In actuality, this second aspect gets little attention in
current qualified immunity analysis. Since the 1982 shift to the
objective test, inquiries into whether an officer acted in good faith
or out of malice are not fully explored.204 In Harlow, the Court
stated that “[w]here an official could be expected to know that
certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he
should be made to hesitate.”205 Nonetheless, the dangling phrase
“or those who knowingly violate the law” seems to linger like a
vestige of the past. Like the human appendix, this once vital
aspect of the qualified immunity test no longer provides a useful
function.
The elimination of the good faith element made the qualified
immunity doctrine more similar than ever before to absolute
immunity. There may be a blurring of the line between absolute
immunity and qualified immunity. Given the Court’s current
position that the certainty of being shielded by the qualified
immunity doctrine is of paramount importance, the grant of
qualified immunity is so likely that it is almost tantamount to
absolute immunity. With regard to absolute immunity, the
Supreme Court stated in 1976 that that it is “in the end better to
leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation.”206 While the Supreme Court made that statement
almost forty years ago with regard to absolute immunity, it
appears that its reasoning reflects the 2012 view as to qualified
immunity.
In short, the objective standard, as applied, has shifted from
what is “reasonable” to what is “not unreasonable” to what is “not
entirely unreasonable.” It appears that all but the plainly
incompetent are shielded from personal liability, and there is
generous leeway for mistakes before an officer would be deemed
incompetent. The Court will withhold the shield of qualified
immunity only if the actions of the officers were so extreme that no
competent officer could possibly have done such a thing. This shift
is particularly evident in the 2012 decisions.

at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244-45.
204. See supra text accompanying note 190 (providing an example of a
court’s refusal in 2011 to inquire as to an official’s motive or malice).
205. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
206. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428 (1976) (referring to absolute,
not qualified, immunity).
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3. Circular Reasoning: Unresolved Legal Questions Remain
Unclear
The avoidance of the constitutional question in qualified
immunity cases leaves an allegedly unclear area of law entirely
unsettled, and the state officials remain uncertain whether their
actions will violate someone else’s constitutional rights. If they are
uncertain, and the law is unclear, then these officials will continue
to be protected by qualified immunity. The resulting circularity is
one of the most striking problems that surfaces in recent Supreme
Court opinions on qualified immunity.
In Reichle, for example, the underlying constitutional
question was whether an arrest in retaliation for the exercise of
First Amendment rights is unlawful when the arrest is justified by
probable cause.207 The Supreme Court announced that it “has
never recognized” such a right,208 but did not decide whether the
right exists. Instead, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court
of Appeals’s application of precedent such as DeLoach,209 which
involved both a retaliatory arrest and a retaliatory prosecution.210
The Court also addressed whether its own decision in Hartman211
that “a plaintiff cannot state a claim of retaliatory prosecution in
violation of the First Amendment if the charges were supported by
probable cause”212 had been correctly interpreted by some courts to
pertain also to retaliatory arrests.213 Saying “we do not suggest
that Hartman’s rule in fact extends to arrests,”214 the Supreme
Court declined to state definitively whether the rule does or does
not apply. Instead, the Court simply opined that “when Howards
was arrested it was not clearly established that an arrest
supported by probable cause could give rise to a First Amendment
violation.”215 Because of the lack of a holding on the underlying
constitutional issue, the answer remains unclear, and the next
police officer in a similar situation will not have guidance as to
whether a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause
will violate the offender’s First Amendment rights. Since the law
is not clearly established, the officer who potentially violates
someone’s rights will be shielded from suit by the doctrine of
qualified immunity.
Not only is circular reasoning illustrated in Reichle, it can
also be seen in other cases in which the Supreme Court denied
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2094.
Id. at 2093.
DeLoach, 922 F.2d 618.
Id. at 620.
Hartman, 547 U.S. 250.
Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2094.
Id.
Id. at 2096.
Id. at 2097.
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certiorari in the October 2011 Term, for example, in lawsuits over
whether public schools’ regulation of students’ internet speech
violates the students’ first amendment rights.216 If a school
principal punishes a student for an off-campus Facebook posting
that targets another student, the law is unsettled as to whether
the landmark school speech test from Tinker217 applies. It is not
clearly established whether the student has a protected First
Amendment right that will be violated if the principal takes
disciplinary action. If the Supreme Court does not clarify the
boundaries of a school’s authority to regulate internet speech, then
that area of law will remain as murky and confusing as it
currently is.218 As long as it remains unresolved as to whether
Tinker applies to such speech, then the second aspect (whether the
constitutional right was clearly established at the time) will be
answered in the negative. When the right is not clearly
established, the school official is entitled to qualified immunity
from suit. Thus, the next time a similar situation arises, the school
official will still be unsure of the legal parameters.
The impact of allowing courts to skip over the threshold
question of whether a constitutional right exists at all has yet to
be fully determined, but if the October 2011 Term’s decisions are
any hint, there will be fewer opinions delving into the underlying
rights and more decisions finding that the law was not clearly
defined. In other words, that circularity will continue: more courts
will avoid clarifying the law and will in turn grant qualified
immunity to officials whose actions were taken when the law was
unclear.
V. CONCLUSION
As Chief Justice Roberts stated, the Supreme Court’s position
is that state officials should be able to rely on the shield of
qualified immunity.219 Certainty—the certainty of being immune
from liability—is important to those who do the work of the
government. Underlying the Supreme Court’s most recent
decisions is a ringing affirmation of the value of public service and
the important nature of government work. The Court’s focus is on
the importance of the governmental system, the vital role of state
officials in maintaining order and promoting the public welfare,
216. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (mem.),
denying cert. to 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Blue Mtn. Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel.
Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir.
2011) (consolidated pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 12.4 with Hermitage
Sch. Dist. v. Layshock); Doninger, 132 S. Ct. 499 (mem.), denying cert. to 642
F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
217. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
218. See, e.g., Doninger, 642 F.3d 334; Kowalski, 652 F.3d 565.
219. Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1666.
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the immunity doctrine’s longstanding historical roots,220 and the
deference and respect due to those who perform government
functions.221
For those who are concerned about individual rights, these
times are tough. Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court stated that
“the resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a
balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative . .
. [and] an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue
for vindication of constitutional guarantees.”222 That avenue has
narrowed. The direction the Supreme Court is now taking is clear,
and it favors those who do the work of the government, not the
average citizen.
That said, it is appropriate to shield government workers
from individual liability if they perform their jobs reasonably and
competently. The risk, however, is that the test is applied so
broadly that it may also protect those state officials who
unreasonably and incompetently violate the individual rights of a
citizen.
Perhaps there will be a return to Saucier-style sequencing in
the next decade, in keeping with the period shifts of the past forty
years of qualified immunity decision-making. Until that time, the
current approach is likely to result in legal stagnation as to
complex and unsettled constitutional questions. It is also likely
that qualified immunity will be granted to government workers in
a substantial majority of the cases brought by aggrieved persons.
The decisions have drifted away from the protection of victims that
the Supreme Court spoke of in Harlow: “The public interest in
deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims
remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal
reasonableness of an official’s acts.”223
For state officials, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on
“certainty” is a wonderful benefit, but for citizens whose rights are
abridged by the government, the prospect of recovering money
damages from the officials is very slim.

220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 1664.
Id. at 1666.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14.
Id. at 819 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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